

February 11

for my countrymen, a danger for the future of the Caribbean and the hemisphere, and I do think that if I have the means, I must take the responsibility.

Mr. COSSIN. Do you think that you might be able to be a symbol of the necessary political unity to restore Haiti to an orderly form of democratic procedure?

Dr. RIGAUD. I do not think that's the way. I'm trying for unity. I want unity. I do not think I should be, but I could be, a symbol of that.

Mr. COSSIN. You would be willing to accept the responsibility, however?

Dr. RIGAUD. Of course.

Mr. COSSIN. Well, isn't this something, so to speak, that might be just around the calendar, because I believe there's another deadline coming up in May, and that isn't too long away. Do you think that there will be another election held, or will there be bloodshed before this in Haiti?

Dr. RIGAUD. I do think there will be bloodshed in Haiti before that. I would like to avoid bloodshed in Haiti, but if Duvalier wants to resist, there will be some.

Mr. COSSIN. How many people live in Haiti?

Dr. RIGAUD. 3,700,000.

Mr. COSSIN. How many of them are educated?

Dr. RIGAUD. Only 13 percent.

Mr. COSSIN. How can they possibly make an intelligent choice under the democratic procedures?

Dr. RIGAUD. That's right. That is our biggest problem. We have to educate the people.

Mr. COSSIN. But this is a long-range project, and the Communists will have the long-range advantage. Therefore, if you are a student of logic, you inevitably edge toward the necessity for some sort of military imposition.

Dr. RIGAUD. Not a military imposition, but we need education, and it is not necessary to have some military imposition to have education.

Mr. COSSIN. Is the vast majority of the population illiterate?

Dr. RIGAUD. They are.

Mr. COSSIN. How do they live? How do they work?

Dr. RIGAUD. They make their living, a very limited living, from their crops. Just living from the products of the soil, and Haiti has the highest density population of any country in Latin America.

Mr. COSSIN. Does it appear to you that this vast majority of illiterates could conceivably be led in any direction, or do they have at least a basic sense of values that could rescue Haiti?

Dr. RIGAUD. They have their land, which gives them their values.

Mr. COSSIN. What is their religion?

Dr. RIGAUD. They are Catholic, but they are very superstitious, so Catholicism and voodoo have blended together somewhat in the country.

Mr. COSSIN. How extensive is voodoo?

Dr. RIGAUD. Very extensive among the peasants.

Mr. COSSIN. How do the Communists face this problem of your religious beliefs?

Dr. RIGAUD. The Communists really try to have chaos in Haiti. Duvalier's persecution of the Catholic Church adds to the chaos.

Mr. COSSIN. How do they act toward voodoo? That must give them a fit.

Dr. RIGAUD. You mean the Communists? They do not move against voodoo. It is too ingrained, and, besides, it represents no threat against communism. What they have in mind is to eliminate the church. They are persecuted now, the Catholics, because they know that it is the largest part of the population of Haiti.

Mr. COSSIN. Do they have any native clergy capable of leading the people?

Dr. RIGAUD. Yes, they have native clergy. One of them, a bishop, has been exiled by Duvalier. You know that Duvalier expelled one archbishop and two bishops.

Mr. COSSIN. You said your family is in Haiti. Are they safe?

Dr. RIGAUD. Up to now, yes. Of course, one of my sons has been beaten once.

Mr. COSSIN. Do you have communication with them?

Dr. RIGAUD. Very badly.

Mr. COSSIN. Well, the last time you heard from them, they were in relatively safe condition.

Well, I'm sorry to have to tell both of us that our time is up for this edition of "Issues in the Air." I certainly want to thank you, Dr. Roger Rigaud, of Haiti, for giving us the benefit of your personal observations of your country at a perilous time in her history.

Good luck, good fortune, and may God bless you in all your future endeavors.

Foresters in Milwaukee Hear Assistant Agriculture Secretary Baker Tell of Rural Renaissance

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, January 24, 1963

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the decline of rural America and all that that meant in terms of unemployment, underemployment, and the uprooting of families long settled on the land have been a cause of serious concern.

It is, therefore, heartening to hear of Assistant Secretary of Agriculture John A. Baker's report of signs of a rural revival.

The account of Mr. Baker's speech in Milwaukee, as reported by the Milwaukee Journal of January 31, 1963, follows:

RURAL RENAISSANCE IN AMERICA DESCRIBED—AGRICULTURE OFFICIAL SAYS GOVERNMENT HELP FOR DEPRESSSED AREAS INCREASED

"A big surge of rural renewal—perhaps the beginning of a rural renaissance" brought John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, to Milwaukee Wednesday to address chief foresters of nine North Central States and Federal Forest Service Chiefs of this region.

"I would not be surprised if history recorded the early 1960's as the turning point after a 100-year trend against rural America," he said in an interview.

Baker said that just his presence here was significant of the administration's interest in helping depressed rural areas. "This is the first time a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet official has attended a regional meeting of State foresters," he said.

Such meetings are held annually for discussion of mutual problems, new programs, and technology. The State foresters heard Baker discuss the Federal rural area development (RAD) program at a dinner at the Wisconsin hotel, and continued their meeting Thursday.

FORESTRY IMPORTANT

Baker attributed his presence to the importance of forestry in the RAD program. In the nine-State north central region, he said, eligible counties (those with unemployment) had 47 percent of their land in commercial forests, not including National or State forests.

He said that the Forest Service, because of long-range plans, had done a remarkable job in the accelerated public works program for rural areas.

"The President released the money Friday," said Baker, "and the Forest Service had 1,500 men at work Monday—and 9,000 by the following Friday." He credited State employment services for their cooperation.

Signs of a rural renaissance, he said, were many:

"The Wall Street Journal has taken note of the increase in factory construction in rural communities in the last couple of years.

STATES RESPONDING

"State governments are responding to rural needs—Wisconsin has been ahead, doing more than most. The Federal Government is responding. The Extension Services and the counties all are working together. Every eligible county in Missouri has an RAD committee.

"The Farmers Home Administration, in existence since 1934, last year for the first time made loans for farm forestry.

"The dollar volume of capital investments (many in rural areas) by the Federal Government will be double, in 1964, what it was in 1960."

This included, he said, Forest Service programs and assistance that were of great importance "because more than half of the counties (nationally) designated as labor surplus areas are the heavily wooded counties."

The 17-Year Trend to Castro

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1963

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, under permission to extend my remarks in the Record, I am pleased to insert an address delivered on January 22, 1963, by the Honorable Clare Boothe Luce, to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Los Angeles, Calif.

THE 17-YEAR TREND TO CASTRO

(By Hon. Clare Boothe Luce)

Is the outcome of the Cuban crisis a defeat or victory for the United States? What hope is there now of liberating Cuba? Was the naval blockade a sign that we are winning or losing the cold war?

I am sure we all agree that the terms "defeat" or "victory" have meaning only in relation to goals, and that we will also agree that the foreign policy goal of the United States since 1945 (the beginning of the cold war) has been to prevent the spreading upon the world of communism.

Consequently, logic requires us to admit that each time the Communists take over a country, or a country voluntarily aligns itself with Moscow or Peking, we are by that many people, and that much territory, further from our goal. Wherever, whenever, or however this happens, we have, have we not, suffered a defeat?

Two weeks ago a conference of world Communist leaders was called to order in East Berlin. In honor of Khrushchev's attendance, East Berlin technicians prepared a goal-trend display. They erected, in the conference hall, a great electrically wired snap of the world. While Khrushchev watched, on flashed the figures of the year 1917—and one red bulb lighted up to show the birth of

Soviet Russia, the first Communist nation, numbering over 100 million people. This red beacon stood alone until 1948. Then came 1948, and with each successive year of the cold war new red bulbs came on, while the Red population figures mounted and mounted. They told the cold war facts: Between the time Mr. Truman entered the White House and Mr. Eisenhower left, 17 nations and a billion people were added to the Communist empire—one-third of the world's population. When, in 1960, Mr. Kennedy arrived in his turn to hold aloft the torch of freedom, there were, however, no red bulbs in the American hemisphere. Then came 1962, and on went the last red light. This represented Castro's Cuba—44,000 square more miles and 6 million more people.

According to the AP press account, the Cuban bulb kept flickering on and off for a minute. This caused some deviationist snickering among the Chinese delegates. But it finally settled down to a steady red glow, and thunderous applause came from all the delegates. None doubted that communism had safely reached the shores of its most powerful enemy.

The map further noted that the 2,800 Communist delegates present represent almost 6 million active and organizing Communist Party members in 70 countries outside the Communist empire, who are working hard to turn the whole world into a red light district. Indeed, the largest single Communist Party outside the Iron, Bamboo and now (I suppose we must call it) Sugar Curtain is in Italy, a NATO member country.

In passing, after 17 years of the cold war, despite several billions of dollars of U.S. postwar economic and military aid, and despite the fact that Italians are enjoying today, as a result of their own efforts, the greatest prosperity they have ever known in all their history, this Communist Party—numbering 1,200,000 voters—shows no sign of weakening. Indeed, only a few weeks ago the Communist Party narrowly missed bringing down the democratic government of Italy, which since 1946 has leaned like the Tower of Pisa toward Moscow.

If this is not a winning trend, for the Communist goal, and a losing trend for the U.S. goal, then surely words, facts, and figures have all lost their meaning.

How has this all come about? Generally speaking, in the same way it came about in Cuba.

A simile comes to my mind from an experiment sometimes done in high school psychology classes. A frog is put in a deep, cool pot of water. He paddles energetically about, looking for something to sit on, and spring from. Then he is taken out, and dropped into a hot pot. At once he groups all his forces and makes a mighty leap out of the pot. Are the students consequently to assume that a frog will always leap to safety out of hot water? Not at all. Another frog is dropped in the cool pot. Then, a burner is lit under the pot, and the water is slowly, slowly heated. Gradually the frog stops paddling and just floats, gasping. In the end the frog is boiled to death—and nary a leap out of him. The psychology of the students watching this experiment is equally interesting. There are squeaks of protest when the first frog is popped into the hot pot, and everybody is happy to see him escape. But they watch the slow boiling of the second frog, fascinated but emotionally indifferent. No doubt they hope he will leap to safety at any moment. But when the frog doesn't seem to care about his own plight, neither do the students.

For those who are interested in the now tried and true political techniques by which Moscow boils little political frogs while the U.S. public watches the pot, I recommend the remarkable account given by Arthur Schlesinger and Kenneth O. Gilmore in the Janu-

ary issue of Reader's Digest, titled "How the Kremlin Took Cuba."

Mr. Kennedy, before he entered the White House, earnestly warned the American people that the Cuban pot was getting warm, and he promised, if elected, either to pull out the frog, or turn off the burner. In the spring of 1961 he made a spasmodic and ineffectual attempt to do so, called the Cuban invasion. But overnight he was faced with a tremendous fact—the invasion which had been badly planned, would fail unless the United States sent military help. To do so meant the overturn of our 17-year-old policy of not interfering militarily with Moscow's peaceful frog boiling technique, and also, our far older policy of nonmilitary intervention in the political experiments of our Latin American neighbors. This rather belated awareness that if he was going to rescue Cuba he would have to scuttle the whole of U.S. military foreign policy, understandably enough scared Mr. Kennedy into inaction. In any event, what we in America today call the Cuban crisis opened with the Bay of Pigs disaster. It reached its climax with the Naval blockade, and the Kennedy-Khrushchev showdown on the missiles, then turned into a U.N. diplomatic bogdown on negotiations over inspection procedures. It formally closed in early January when U.S.S.R. negotiators met United States negotiators as usual, halfway. They were willing to agree that they were wrong, if we would agree they were right. In short, they agreed to remove the missiles, if we agreed they could keep Cuba.

The net of the blockade was that Khrushchev publicly backed down, and according to U.S. intelligence reports actually took home all of his missiles and bombers—that is, all we had been able to spot by air surveillance. So this—so far as we can tell—restored the nuclear balance of power which Mr. Kennedy had inherited from Mr. Eisenhower. The nuclear football was, in other words, put back again on the West Berlin 50-yard line. Although the restoration of the geographical nuclear status quo can hardly be called a glowing victory, Americans got a good look at the U.S. Navy on television, and also of the color of Mr. Khrushchev's face, which for once matched his political convictions. And no Americans got hurt. All this gave the U.S. people great satisfaction, and consequently increased Mr. Kennedy's domestic political stature—which gave him a lot of satisfaction. But Mr. Kennedy also backed down. The on-site inspection demand was an operative military part of the Kennedy ultimatum. But this demand was dropped in the lap of Ambassador Stevenson, who was quietly set up for the second time—by Mr. Kennedy to take whatever blame or criticism the American people feel attaches to the second U.S. backdown on a Cuban invasion. Since then missiles and inspection issues have been kicked, by Mr. U Thant, under the big, oriental rug the U.S. keeps for pro-Western issues.

When it became obvious to Mr. Khrushchev that we did not intend to invade Cuba whether or not an on-site inspection was granted this also gave the Russians much satisfaction and increased Khrushchev's political stature. In the end bows were taken by Mr. Kennedy to the right, and Mr. Khrushchev to the left for averting a nuclear holocaust which neither of them, nor anybody else, wanted.

Nevertheless, although we have suffered a defeat in Cuba, the naval blockade was a very educational exercise for anybody who can still be educated on United States and U.S.S.R. military and political policies. And some good came of it. Mr. Khrushchev has stopped acting like the terrible tempered "Mr. Nuclear Bangs" for the moment, anyway. He has now admitted to the press that he would not attend any nuclear funeral, and a joint Washington-Moscow funeral, and

yesterday he admitted that nuclear test bans had to be combined with some sort of inspection in Russia. For the rest, it has been no news to the world for 17 years that the United States is a "paper tiger" until her vital interests are directly threatened. But it is news to many of the Communists outside Russia that the U.S.S.R. is a "paper bear" unless her vital interests are threatened. In short, the naval blockade showed the world that for identical reasons, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are equally—and one can now say—mutually determined to avoid any direct military conflict. We are not going to have a nuclear war with one another over Cuba, or Berlin, or for that matter, the moon. Moscow will continue to supply weapons and promote revolutions and brush-fire wars to any small nation that wants to do its own killing, and the United States will arrive to help the defenders, as usual a bit on the freight, with the anti-brush-fire bucket brigade of its technicians. The cold war will, in other words, wag away as usual. I suspect, however, that the Soviets will rely less on limited war, and more on its frog-boiling techniques, which have proved so successful in Cuba.

It also showed with what ease the U.S.S.R. can slip nuclear weapons into any country it controls. It also showed the Latin American nations that their only choice is to work out their political destiny under either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and it demonstrated that from here out we have made the nuclear choice for them. It also showed, unhappily, the Communists now have our leave to establish Communist republics anywhere in this hemisphere, so long as these republics remain inoffensive. By inoffensive we mean, of course, militarily incapable of plastering the White House, demolishing the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, or interfering with Mr. and Mrs. America's television reception.

What really got hurt as the immediate result of the blockade was Comrade Castro's feelings. During the blockade he was bumped from the rank of the bearded secular savior of South America to that of a minor Communist prophet. What he thought of, no doubt, as his nuclear weapons, were snatched away from him by Khrushchev. However, the United States has done what it could to smooth down his ruffled feelings and restore his image. In exchange for the Bay of Pigs prisoners Mr. Kennedy promptly gave him \$63 million worth of drugs, marketable abroad for about \$100 million. The large amounts of optimum Castro got were especially soothing, as they can be processed into heroin, smuggled into the United States and sold for gratifying amounts to U.S. crime syndicates. This massive Kennedy aid will allow him to weather Kennedy economic sanctions for a year, anyway. Moreover, Khrushchev promptly signed a 5-year economic agreement with him and has forced all the European satellites to sign other agreements. Moscow will certainly not pull the economic or political rug out from under Cuba. That red light bulb just can't go out now without hurting Khrushchev badly with the home folks, not to say with South America's 270,000 Communist Party members. And to be quite sure that it won't go out, 16,000 Russian technicians have been garrisoned in Cuba to put down any anti-Castro rebellion that arises. Of course they are a dual-purpose outfit. If Castro should at any point prove as troublesome as Russian diplomats claim he is boring, they can also put down Castro.

Meanwhile, Moscow has given Castro the largest and best equipped army in this hemisphere, outside the United States, and will, of course, see that it gets bigger. And for Communist hemisphere propaganda, organizing of terrorist activities, and gunrunning,

So long as Cuba confines itself to these so-called inoffensive activities, does the United States have any intention of intervening? Not unless someone can raise, refurbish, and sink the *Maine* again in Manila's harbor. Our policy is now firmly one of peaceful coexistence with hemispheric communism.

For any who still have doubts on this score, there is the concrete evidence of the President's own words. As you all know, the President gave a now-famous, strictly off-the-record, background conference on world affairs to 35 pressmen in Palm Beach on January 2. But there was one British pressman present. And—cricket not being what it used to be in England (nothing is)—whole hunks of it have since appeared in the British press.

Plainly if there are any of you who are not familiar with the contents, you have as much right to know what our President is thinking about Cuba as the English do, not to say the Russians.

The President said the following things: He has no plans to rearm the Cuban rebels, and in fact would restrain anyone who might attempt it, under current conditions; he said his policy is to work for a change in the Communist regime, but that it is not our intention to invade under current conditions, nor to begin a war against Cuba, providing Cuba lives in peace with its neighbors. We are, he said, opposed to Communist control of Cuba and to its intimate association with the Soviet Union, and we hope for a change. So he thinks, he said, that all we can set down now is a general attitude of the United States toward Cuba, and our willingness to support any free choice that the Cuban people make following Castro, and to hold out a hope to the people of Cuba that the United States would be sympathetic for a change.

In short, the President hopes that the boiled frog may still leap out of the pot, even though it is quite clear to everyone that Khrushchev has already had froglegs for dinner. Today the Department of State views Cuba, as it does Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, as just one more captive nation. Most of you don't like this. Well, let's be blunt: We could still invade Cuba, of course, and the Russians would again withdraw. But an invasion now would cost many American lives—perhaps a great many. This, understandably enough, would be very unpopular with Americans. You do remember, don't you, what happened to the Democratic Party when Mr. Truman, with a courage for which he has never been given much credit, stopped the Reds in Korea? It got booted out in the next Presidential election.

The American people want—they terribly want—to stop the Communists. But if Americans get hurt, or even if America gets criticized abroad, in the process they take it out—now isn't this a fact—on the President and party in power. Mr. Kennedy is a brave man, but he is no hero. And like all politicians he is professionally allergic to martyrdom.

Let's face it: Courage in any elected official is almost a contradiction in terms. He must struggle to lead the people up the right path, knowing that he will probably get licked if he doesn't follow them down the wrong one.

Now let us ask our last question, but one: Will coexistence with Cuba control the spread of communism into the rest of America? Alas, coexistence is like a woman's girdle: it controls the spread for 1 year—the next she has to buy a bigger girdle. Well, what will control the spread?

We have already agreed that the U.S. policy is, and has been for 17 years, against the use of force as a political or diplomatic

weapon and that this policy has had the support of the American people. In other words, today as yesterday, and tomorrow as today, we have no intention of forcibly throwing out the Communists in any country, anywhere, even though a division of Marines could do it. So shall we agree that this leaves us with the same tools we have used for 17 years?—Economic aid to still non-Communist countries, and propaganda. In short, billions of dollars and billions of words—words—words. No one can count the words. But since the cold war began the United States has spent some \$97 billion stopping, as the expression goes, communism.

Consequently, today the Government is putting all its South American anti-Communist eggs in the \$6 billion Alliance for Progress funds basket. Within the next few years most of them will be scrambled into anti-American omelets, either by the Communists, or right wing military dictatorships. The democratic experiments have already failed in Peru and the Argentine. And despite the democratic facades of some governments and democratic desires of South America's wisest statesmen, the army—or armed police forces—are everywhere in Latin America the politically decisive factors. Most Latin American countries are still run by the law of force, and not by the force of law.

Many Americans, witnessing the astounding success of Marshall plan funds, simply cannot explain why economic aid worked so well in Europe and doesn't seem to work in the so-called underprivileged nations. Europe is old, well organized, and highly literate. To use the President's favorite, though now somewhat overworked word, it is a very "sophisticated" area. Europeans have evolved over centuries an understanding of the political processes of self-government and have tremendous economic and agricultural know-how. These conditions simply do not exist in Latin America.

Not more than 10 percent of the South American population is literate. The church—a conservative influence—has all but entirely lost its influence. The poverty of the masses is abysmal, and the population is increasing enormously. In passing, the control of nuclear energy is apple pie simple in comparison to the control of sexual energy. And no government has as yet invented any reliable on-site inspection procedures for controlling it.

There is a South American tradition—a passionately held one—the tradition of sovereignty. Also, in passing, this is the curse of the southern half of this hemisphere. There is no doubt that a United States of South America could, in a matter of decades, become a strong world power. But there is no tradition of democratic government in the United States or European sense, and of course few democratic institutions to work through. By and large, the social conscience of the rich is feudal. Far too many of the politicians have hardly reached the moral level of our old-style Tammany Hall ward leaders. Given enough U.S. dollars these political leaders can always whip up a few pro-American howler and marching clubs for the comfort of visiting Congressmen. But even the most dedicated of them do not know how to instill party loyalty, or party discipline in their own followers—the Communists, of course, excepted.

Moreover, what we would call corruption in the present conditions, far too many South American politicians call common-sense. It is no secret to those who know Latin America that plenty of U.S. aid dollars pass from public to private hands, and then on into private Swiss bank accounts. Many South American politicians feel it is only prudent to carry this sort of personal and family life insurance against the hour of the Communist takeover—which has become somewhat more imminent since the United

States abandoned Cuba to Castro. Add that U.S. capital investors did not find the expropriation of a billion dollars of U.S. investments and property in Cuba, or the recent expropriation of U.S. property in Brazil by President Goulart's brother-in-law very encouraging economic omens. And consequently, private U.S. capital investment has fallen off greatly in Latin America.

Is there nothing that our Government can do to make U.S. economic aid to Latin America really pay off in terms of stopping communism? Very little. Today most Latin American politicians have learned the exciting and remunerative art of economic brinkmanship from watching 17-year-old U.S. cold war policies.

If U.S. officials insist that our aid be wisely spent, and that recipient countries make political reforms in behalf of the people, a hubbaloob rises from right to left that the United States wants to interfere in their political affairs, that this is Yankee imperialism, and that it will create more communism. If the United States then says OK, we won't interfere, we'll just cut off aid, this is countered with the threat (and it's no idle one) that the Communies will then surely take over.

The last distinguished American in South America to try this tough line—that is counter economic brinkmanship, was Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Flushed with his triumph of arm twisting his fellow Americans for \$53 million of ransom money to Castro, he borrowed Mr. Rusk's shoes and headed, a month ago, for Brazil to twist President Goulart's arm. There he pointed out the fact to Brazilian leaders that Brazil's policy of inflation, and of a constantly unbalanced budget, would, in the end, prove disastrous. Mr. Goulart probably didn't remind him that in these respects, anyway, Brazil is following the American way. All he needed to point out is that there are 50,000 Communists in Brazil, waiting to take over the day the Brazilian economy collapses—which will be the day U.S. aid stops flowing. If there weren't Communists in Brazil, the Brazilians would import them from Cuba. For 17 years the presence of a large Communist Party in any country is a guarantee that it can continue to live beyond its means because U.S. aid will come in. Mr. Kennedy, like all his predecessors, soon caved in—leaving \$30 million tied to nothing but promises that things will certainly be put to rights in Brazil—the Communies permitting.

Please do not misunderstand. The fact that much of our aid will be wasted is no reason why the United States should not have a large foreign aid program. I think we should have. But as a matter of honest Christian charity. As the President recently pointed out, we spend only a fraction of our gross national income in helping our world neighbors. The fact is, that if we look sometimes like suckers to ourselves, we look like pikers south of the border, and both views are perfectly correct.

Then who is going to stop the spread of communism? Our best bet is the Russians.

Today the Russians are a nation of 200 million people. Their own domestic living standards are still not worth bragging about, and they have plenty of domestic economic troubles. Economic and military aid to underprivileged Communist nations is even a greater drain on their resources than U.S. aid to non-Communist countries is on ours. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the Communists manage to boil the Brazilian frog, and Brazil went behind what we would certainly all call the "coffee curtain." Well, the Russians would certainly have plenty of coffee to put around their Cuban sugar. The coffee break might even become a Russian institution. This would have the virtue of saving up the work,

and producing ulcers. But in exchange for mountains of little black beans—Brazil's main export—the Russians would have to pick up Brazil's colossal fuel and tool bill to keep its industrial plant going, or it would have to dismantle Brazilian industry. In order to do the latter, it would have to do what it has done for Castro, and provide Brazil with inoffensive weapons and garrison it with about 80,000 technicians. You see the 80 million Brazilians wouldn't like communism any better than the 6 million Cubans do, when they'd got it. And if these maintenance bills should fall due in the near future, the Russian people will have to sacrifice their present diet of horse meat and settle for roasted macaws and boiled monkeys. The Brazilian masses, of course, would have to settle for starvation, because the United States would certainly not intervene. If not in next door Cuba, why in far off Brazil?

We now turn to our last thought—the Sino-Russian quarrel. Much is made of the ideological battle which has now burst into the open, between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev. The real quarrel, as any sensible person knows, has little to do with Marxian dogmas. It has everything to do with China's own desperate needs for military and economic aid, which she is not getting from Russia, and even more with lebensraum, which she also wants desperately for her teeming millions. The nearest vacant spaces—where else?—Russian Manchuria, Siberia and Yakutsk. The Chinese people will be 700 million in another decade. Land is what China wants and needs, and soon must have. The Russians who know, somewhat better than we do, a potential enemy when they see one, have for some time been building up their defenses and their population on their Chinese borders. It is no accident that when they granted us the right to test for nuclear explosions it was on their Chinese border—China's own atomic bomb is just around the corner.

Furthermore, the Russians see with considerable clarity that the current Chinese devotion to so called Leninist ideas of aggressive and militaristic Communist expansion means that China would like to egg the West and the U.S.S.R. into a nuclear conflict. And they also see who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of such a conflict—the vultures, the cockroaches and the rats, and of course the Chinese Communists, who would all get along splendidly.

If the United States only has the wisdom to stay out of the Sino-Russian quarrel, the Communist problem may begin to yield in the next decade or two. The President says that communism bears within itself the seeds of its own disintegration. But what—and who—for that matter, doesn't?

But if Russia comes a real cropper in the next decade, it will be for a good old fashioned thousand of years old reason: Empires who bite off more than they can militarily or economically chew become progressively weaker. And then their neighbors—the Chinese, in this case—if they can find the means to do so, put the bite on them. The logic of Russia's position today is that she too must try to egg us into a war—but a war with Communist China. I predict that a few years from now all Moscow parties and fellow travelers will be encouraging the United States to unleash Chiang. Why fight your enemies, if you can get your other enemies to do the fighting for you?

Meanwhile, the realities of the world political situation are such that the only victories outside the United States this administration can hope to chalk up against Russia now are in space. Or, as the President calls it, for some odd reason, outer space. And if our devotion to our 17-year-old coexistence policy continues, outer-space victories will have

4 years in office. I offer no objection. No doubt we can afford \$40 billion worth of moon-shooting and star-gazing while we wait, reasonably safe, under our nuclear umbrella, for the big Russian-Chinese showdown. Between them they will bury perhaps a score or more unhappy nations like Cuba. But in the end they are more likely to bury each other than to bury the West. That is, on one condition—that we don't develop a policy to prevent it. This can, of course, happen. In view of the outcome of World War II, when a beaten Russia began to snatch the world peace-meal from the strongest military power on earth and has now made us back down in our own hemisphere, let us never underestimate our own capacity to snatch defeat from the fires of victory.

In closing, I see by the papers that a favorite aide of the President, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has written a book called "The Politics of Hope." No doubt, when the politics of reason do not produce votes, and generally they don't, hope becomes the best possible substitute. Anyway, I'm all for hope, and I'm sure you all are. So on this hopeful note I thank you, and bid you good evening.

See Americana First?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. MORRIS K. UDALL

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1963

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, we often hear it said, or implied, that free enterprise and the American Way of Life guarantee every businessman the right to despoil our countryside at will. Because such arguments seem to convince some people it is exceedingly difficult to do anything to prevent the steady destruction of the remaining areas of natural beauty in our land. Similarly, it is almost impossible to enact legislation that will permit motorists to travel our highways and see America first. They may see Americana, but they would not see much of America.

In Arizona we are attempting to enact legislation to provide some protection from billboard blight along our highways. Since this is a problem still faced by most of our States, I want to call the attention of my colleagues to an excellent editorial on this subject appearing in the Yuma Daily Sun of Yuma, Ariz. The editorial follows:

[From the Yuma Daily Sun, Yuma, Ariz., Jan. 29, 1963]

BILLBOARDS ARE SPOILING ARIZONA

In Arizona, where tourism provides a first impression which could result in repeated visits or later demand for housing, that impression is being seriously damaged by visual hucksterism.

This unhappy fact is well documented in the December issue of Arizona Architect, the monthly magazine of the Arizona Society of Architects.

But the damage done to Arizona tourism is only one of the bad aspects of visual hucksterism. The architects' magazine points to two others: the cost to the taxpayer of erecting additional highway signs which are needed to compete with the

distraction of roadside signs is a contributing cause of traffic accidents.

The answer to this unsightly liability to Arizona's scenery and traffic safety is, of course, State regulation. Is it right to regulate billboards? The Arizona Architect points that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the principle that the legislature has the power "to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled."

How excessive signs are costing Arizona taxpayers is detailed by the Arizona Architect: "Excessive commercial signs cause highway departments to erect unnecessarily repetitious warning signs in order to increase the chance that drivers will see markers important to their safety. Particularly is this true of speed reduction signs on the cluttered approaches to most cities and towns. Within cities, traffic departments erect costly and unsightly multiple-signal standards and extra-large back plates to help make warning lights distinguishable from commercial signs."

On the damage to tourism, the magazine says: "All too often, Arizonians are being judged by their visitors as a people carelessly indulgent of an industry that wantonly robs us of our scenic wealth. Most businesses invest private capital to provide the public with specific goods and services to which roads give access. The billboard industry, on the other hand, capitalizes on the public's huge investment in roads, making relatively minor investment of its own capital. Advertising signs and billboards, which not only are parasitic by nature, are a form of unremovable litter that interferes with more interesting, natural, and satisfying views from our roads."

To correct these abuses, the Arizona Scenery Protection Council will propose an effective law this month to the legislature. The council is composed of representatives of garden clubs, women's clubs, architects, landscape architects, conservation groups, and individuals from all walks of life. The aims of the Council have been endorsed by the Arizona Building Contractors, Farm Bureau, and many other citizens' organizations.

We hope that Yuma County's five spokesmen in the legislature will give their full support to this measure to control flagrant abuses against Arizona's natural beauty.

Let's Find Some Other Way

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WALT HORAN

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 11, 1963

Mr. HORAN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my own remarks in the Appendix of the Record, I am pleased to include an editorial from the magazine Country Beautiful which they have entitled, "Focus: On Survival of Individualism."

To me this editorial stresses the need to find some other way than those proposed for our farm problems.

The article follows:

FOCUS: ON SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALISM

When most of America is at play on a mid-summer Saturday afternoon, the farmer is at work tending a haystack along a country road. He is in the barn tending livestock. He rarely complains